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An Efficient Anticorruption Sanctions Regime?
The Case of the World Bank
Tina Søreide, Linda Gröning, and Rasmus Wandall ∗

Abstract
With its sanctions regime, the World Bank has sent a clear message to client governments
and suppliers that it will not tolerate corruption. However, as this Article argues, with its present
design, the sanctions regime at the same time runs counter to the World Bank’s own development
agenda. Thus, the regime will have limited effect in protecting funds for development, reducing
corruption risks, promoting the integrity and functionality of markets, and strengthening domestic
law enforcement institutions. A key problem is that efforts to strengthen law enforcement at the
national level are too limited. The sanctions primarily target private suppliers, while governments
are not held responsible when fraud or corruption occurs. This reflects the World Bank’s
challenging mandate to offer financial support to developing country governments while also trying
to secure efficient use of the funds after they have been transferred. In considering alternative
designs for its anticorruption strategy, the Bank should collaborate with other international
development banks to demand integrity mechanisms that rely upon and strengthen domestic law
enforcement institutions and competition authorities in client countries.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
While international development banks seek to support governments in their
development efforts, corruption in recipient societies can undermine this support.
For this reason, these banks attach to their financial transfers a range of integrity
criteria and mechanisms aimed at securing value for money and preventing theft. 1
These include, most commonly, professional procurement rules, external audits,
and the enforcement of rules that deem illegal a set of actions found damaging to
development initiatives, including fraud, corruption, and collusion. Many recipient
governments are not able or trusted to adequately enforce the requested integrity
mechanisms, or they lack motivation to secure funds coming from an international
organization; therefore, the development banks have started to operate their own
controls and act upon detected violations of the agreed-upon rules and laws. They
operate hotlines for internal and external whistle-blowers, instruct project
managers on what suspicious acts they should report, and demand careful audits
of the projects and programs they finance. If they did not, they could easily be
seen as condoning fiduciary risks and even as facilitating crime and corruption,
given the large amounts of money they transfer to countries with weak law
enforcement institutions.
A financial institution established to promote development, however, is not
vested with the powers usually associated with efficient law enforcement, such as
the authority to investigate, obtain evidence, and summon actors to court. Facing
cases of corruption, the World Bank’s impact on criminal justice will rely largely
on collaboration with law enforcement systems at the national level. Their support
cannot be taken for granted—particularly not in cases where high-ranking
politicians or civil servants are suspected of involvement in wrongdoing.
Accordingly, a development bank’s power to enforce laws and sanction offenses
independent of national criminal justice systems and sanctions regimes is limited
to its capacity as a supreme financial institution—it can exclude players from the
financial services it offers. Despite this limited enforcement mechanism,
1

For an overview of initiatives, see Marie Chêne, U4 Expert Answer: Multilateral Development Banks'
Integrity Management Systems (Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.transparency.
org/files/content/corruptionqas/264_Multilateral_development_banks_integrity_management.p
df. Steps to harmonize measures were taken in 2007 with a joint task force on preventing corruption
in lending. See INT’L FIN. INST. ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE, Uniform Framework for Preventing and
Combatting Fraud and Corruption (2006), available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/
afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Uniform_Framework_for_Combatting_Fraud_and
_Corruption.pdf. For an example of steps taken by one of the development banks, see World Bank,
Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA
Credits and Grants (2011), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDS
ContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/04/15/000356161_20110415011758/Rendered/PDF/611090B
R0SecM21Disclosed04113120111.pdf.
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development banks have attempted to develop their own anticorruption sanctions
regimes. This step can be understood as an attempt to compensate for law
enforcement weaknesses in recipient countries as part of the banks’ strategy
toward the overall goal of development. 2
This Article addresses the function of these sanctions regimes by looking at
the case of the World Bank. Among international financial institutions, the World
Bank has been at the forefront in developing a sanctions regime. Its regime is the
earliest, most comprehensive, most open, and most recognized. In the period
from 2007 to 2014, the World Bank imposed sanctions on around 250 firms and
individuals by temporarily suspending them from operating on World Bankfinanced development projects and programs. 3 When governments fail to meet
certain integrity criteria or to act appropriately upon suspected fraud, collusion, or
corruption, the World Bank and the other development banks can suspend or cut
off financial support to governments; such actions are often referred to as
remedies. Yet these remedies are not used frequently and seem not to be
implemented with an intention to identify the individual leaders responsible for
governance failure or clear-cut crime. 4 Instead, the sanctions regime is targeted
primarily at the suppliers of World Bank-financed contracts and operations.
The Legal Vice Presidency of the World Bank, which oversees the sanctions
regime, has modified the regime several times following reviews of its
functionality. 5 As part of these review processes, the institution has invited

2

For an introduction to these regimes, see Norbert Seiler & Jelena Madir, Fight Against Corruption:
Sanctions Regimes of Multilateral Development Banks, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 5–28 (2012). An introduction
to the development banks’ sanctions regimes and the status of harmonization between them can
be found in Frank A. Fariello & Conrad C. Daly, Coordinating the Fight against Corruption among MDBs:
The Past, Present, and Future of Sanctions, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 253–68 (2013).

3

The figure reported for 2007–2013 is 239 firms and individuals, but additional suppliers were
sanctioned in 2014. See THE WORLD BANK OFFICE OF SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT, Report on
Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007–2013, 24 (2014), available at http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/OSDReport.pdf.

4

For yearly statistics on referrals leading to prosecuted cases in the countries where the corruption
has occurred, see Annual Reports, THE WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE
/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTDOII/0,,contentMD
K:22203443~menuPK:5372841~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:588921,00.html
(last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
A historical perspective on the World Bank’s sanctions regime is provided in Dick Thornburgh et
al., Report Concerning the Debarment Processes of the World Bank (2002), at 10-12 (2002), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROCUREMENT/Resources/thornburghreport.pdf
[hereinafter Thornburgh Report]. For legal details of the regime, see Sope Williams, The Debarment
of Corrupt Contractors from World Bank-Financed Contracts, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 277, 289-304 (2007) and
Pascale Hélène Dubois, Domestic and International Administrative Tools to Combat Fraud and Corruption:
A Comparison of US Suspension and Debarment with the World Bank’s Sanctions System, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 195, 216-34 (2012). On legal aspects of the regime, with debate about achievements and reforms

5
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external experts to share their views about the sanctions regime. A next step in its
review, according to the Bank, is to assess “the overall efficiency and effectiveness
of the system—i.e., whether the system as a whole is meeting its objectives of
excluding corrupt actors and deterring fraud and corruption in World Bank Group
operations, at an appropriate cost to the World Bank Group.” 6
Motivated by such calls and processes, this Article discusses the performance
of the sanctions regime in terms of how well the Bank protects funds, promotes
fair markets, reduces corruption, and secures confidence in the World Bank. While
these aims exceed the narrowly-stipulated goal of the sanctions regime to protect
the funds for development support, they are each relevant for this debate. In this
Article they are viewed as cumulative criteria, meaning that it would not be
satisfactory if the sanctions regime were dysfunctional in any of them. Therefore,
we set out to address both efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency in this study
refers to the achievement of objectives in a cost-efficient way, given a choice of
alternative strategies—that is, an economic understanding of the term.
Effectiveness, however, is understood as “doing the right thing” given the overall
goals of the institution. With this distinction, we go beyond an assessment of the
sanctions regime per se. Instead of addressing a sub-system’s efficiency separately
from the overall development goal of its organization, we consider the regime in
the broader development perspective associated with the World Bank. The
objective of rebuilding domestic law enforcement in client economies 7 is therefore
addressed, in addition to the mentioned aims of protecting the funds, promoting
fair markets, reducing corruption, and securing confidence in the institution,
because it is essential for development.
Given this perspective, we argue that the sanctions regime faces problems in
delivering efficiently on these specified aims, even if the World Bank overall plays
a central role in promoting anticorruption in the world. The organization seems
to have developed this regime as if the fiduciary risks and problems associated
with governance in developing countries could be detached from the very
institutions and societies where the problems are embedded, and brought into a
from the perspective of the World Bank, see generally ANNE-MARIE LEROY & FRANK A. FARIELLO,
THE WORLD BANK GROUP SANCTIONS PROCESS AND ITS RECENT REFORMS (2012).
6

7

The World Bank Group, Initiating Discussion Brief: Review of World Bank Group Sanctions Regime 2011–
2014, Phase I Review: Stock-Taking, at 3 (2014), available at https://consultations.worldbank.org/
Data/hub/files/consultation-template/consultation-review-world-bank-group-sanctionssystemopenconsultationtemplate/materials/sanctionsreview_initiatingdiscussionbrief.pdf.
The
document describes a two-part review process. The first part, a stock-taking exercise that collected
critical comments from internal and external experts, was completed by 2014. A second part will
consider the system’s efficiency and effectiveness. On its sanctions system website, the World Bank
publishes reports about the sanctions system, including critical comments provided as part of the
review process.
The World Bank refers to countries receiving development support from the institution as client
countries.
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sphere where the Bank itself can exercise control. Within this sphere, the focus
on ensuring due process in the implementation of sanctions seems to have
outweighed the importance of considering whether the regime is having its
intended impacts on the ground.
The Article consists of three main sections. In Section II the sanctions
regime in the context of the World Bank’s mandate is considered. Section III
describes the World Bank’s efforts to ensure due process, modeled on the
procedures typically found within national justice systems. Finally, Section IV
addresses the system’s effectiveness and efficiency more specifically. Conclusions
and recommendations follow.

II. T HE W ORLD B ANK ’ S P OSITION AND THE P URPOSE
OF S ANCTIONS
At first glance, the World Bank’s sanctions regime comes across as irrational.
The organization offers loans and aid to the governments of developing countries
and makes these governments responsible for pro-development spending.
However, when the money disappears because of corruption and fraud, the World
Bank does not hold the government responsible, but instead places sanctions on
the suppliers operating in contract with the recipient government. A closer look
at the particular position and authority of the World Bank reveals the rationality
of this regime. This Section aims at outlining some of the basic features of the
World Bank’s regime. First, in II.A, we take a closer look at the mandate of the
World Bank. Thereafter, in II.A we discuss how the World Bank collaborates with
its member countries, as its clients, particularly with a view on anti-corruption
measures. Lastly, for explanation of the sanctions regime’s current structures and
rules, we address in II.C this sub-system’s historical background and development.

A.

The
World
Bank’s
Sanctions Regime

Mandate

for

Having

a

The World Bank sanctions system is anchored in the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Articles of Agreement, last amended
in 2012. According to Article I(i), the institution’s purpose is “to assist in the
reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the
investment of capital for productive purposes, including . . . the encouragement
of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed
countries.” 8 The phrase “facilitating the investment of capital for productive
purposes” refers to the World Bank’s prime function of managing funds
8

Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Articles of Agreement (as amended effective, art. I(i) (June 27,
2012)), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/IBRD
ArticlesOfAgreement_links.pdf.
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transferred from the more developed countries and offering loans and aid to
governments for the purpose of reducing poverty and promoting development.
The organization, steered by a board consisting of member-government
representatives (as stipulated by its Articles of Agreement), controls development
funds on behalf of donor governments. These donor governments, who have to
defend to their voters and national auditors the amounts of state revenues
transferred for development support, of course expect accountable spending. 9
According to Article III, Section 5(b), “The Bank shall make arrangements
to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes for which
the loan was granted, with due attention to considerations of economy and
efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or
considerations.” 10 The responsibilities spelled out in these articles are often
referred to as the World Bank’s “fiduciary duty,” or its “obligation to reduce
fiduciary risks.” 11 At the same time, however, the institution’s authorization is
anchored in the idea of redistribution; it is expected to meet a demand in wealthy
countries for sharing with those who have less. It is obliged to offer favorable
monetary services to member countries in need, even if there is generally a higher
risk of corruption in developing countries. This duty implies the Bank cannot
easily cut support to poor countries just because their governments cannot be
trusted. It is therefore well-established that a core rationality for the World Bank
is to transfer funds to poor areas, including societies with a high risk of fraud and
theft.

B. Balancing Collaboration and Anticorruption Imperatives
The World Bank collaborates closely with its client countries regardless of
integrity concerns. The governments can be encouraged to introduce integrity
systems and can be influenced to enforce their laws, but they hold a monopoly on
law enforcement. Good dialogue is essential to the Bank’s ability to promote
recipient governments’ capacities and pro-development priorities, especially in
countries where integrity mechanisms are not strongly institutionalized. The
World Bank does raise concerns about various corruption risks with recipient
governments. 12 If the Bank voices such insinuations too loudly or explicitly,
9

Indeed, although the Bank formally manages funds on behalf of all its members, rich as well as
poor, donor governments are the ones that actually transfer funds to the institution and expect
them to be spent accountably, while other members are recipients.

10

Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Articles of Agreement, supra note 8, at art. III(5)(b).
Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Articles of Agreement, supra note 8.

11
12

The World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group has reviewed the institution’s governance and
anticorruption strategy for the period from 2007–2013 and provided an overview of the many
approaches to promoting anticorruption initiatives in dialogue with governments, civil society, and

Winter 2016

529

Chicago Journal of International Law

however, it may jeopardize its collaboration with a recipient government, and this
in turn may have repercussions for various development programs introduced to
improve health, education, and infrastructure, for example. 13 Instead, the World
Bank encourages the introduction of integrity-promoting laws and institutions,
seeks to enlarge the space for civil society watchdogs, and, to some extent, puts
pressure on governments by including pro-accountability steps as part of loan
agreements. 14 Nonetheless, in circumstances where initiatives to promote integrity
and law enforcement come into conflict with the interests of a corrupt elite or the
dishonest intentions of an incumbent regime, there are limits to what the World
Bank can do. The institution is then placed in an awkward situation, as it is
expected to transfer funds to the recipient government, but also to protect the
funds.
This is why the sanctions regime can be seen as a pragmatic response to the
risks of fraud and corruption. It is built on the authority that the World Bank does
have—the Bank can deny spending to players in the private sector if they are
involved in fraud, as they are not clients. By limiting the scope for corruption to
state-private sector interactions, the World Bank strives to reduce the risk of
corruption. The Bank operates a number of other governance and anticorruption
initiatives directed at governments, including investments in domestic justice
sector reform programs as well as law enforcement components of projects it
finances in other sectors. 15 Upon discovering indicators of funds mismanaged by
governments, there is usually a prompt reaction by the Bank, followed by a clear
request for facts, investigation, and enhanced supervision, sometimes resulting in
the private sector. See Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank Country-Level Engagement on
Governance and Anticorruption: An Evaluation of the 2007 Strategy and Implementation Plan, (2012), available
at http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/gac_eval.pdf.
13

Kabur and Webb investigate attempts by international financial institutions to include governancerelated conditionalities in their lending agreements with developing countries. The results of such
attempts are meager; the conditionalities are often too loosely defined for enforcement and are
rarely supported with actual cuts in spending. Although the study is more than a decade old, it is
still relevant, as there are few developments to suggest that the results would be very different today.
Devesh Kabur & Richard Webb, Governance-Related Conditionalities of the International Financial
Institutions, in 6 G-24 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 1 (2000), available at
http://213.154.74.164/invenio/record/16107/files/kupur.pdf.

14

For details about the World Bank’s anticorruption strategies, see Governance and Public Sector
Management, THE WORLD BANK, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL
/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:22996457~pagePK:1
48956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:286305,00.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).

15

For discussion of its justice reform initiatives, see Legal Vice Presidency, The World Bank: New
Directions in Justice Reform: A Companion Piece to the Updated Strategy and Implementation Plan on
Strengthening
Governance,
Tackling
Corruption
(2012),
available
at
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/09/06/000386194_2
0120906024506/Rendered/PDF/706400REPLACEM0Justice0Reform0Final.pdf;
see
also
Governance, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance (last visited
Oct. 4, 2015).
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halted development support. In addition, the Bank has initiated a number of broad
cross-country anticorruption initiatives, facilitated numerous expert working
groups, and developed methodologies for analyzing corruption-related problems
and toolkits for developing efficient strategies. It also supports several
international programs such as the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR), the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Construction Sector
Transparency Initiative (CoST), and a network for collaboration with
anticorruption agencies worldwide. When it comes to holding someone
responsible for corruption, however, the organization focuses on suppliers of
government contracts. Therefore, while governments are the ones that receive and
control funds from the World Bank and are told to act responsibly, it is the firms
on contract to the recipient government that can most easily be held responsible
when fraud and corruption occur.

C. Background for the Current Sanctions Regime
The current sanctions regime must be understood as a result of ongoing
developments in the World Bank. An early form of sanctions was introduced in
1996, not long after James Wolfensohn was appointed president of the World
Bank and around the time he gave his famous “cancer of corruption” speech. 16
By 1996, several multilateral organizations, including the United Nations (U.N.)
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
had started policy work on corruption, including preparatory steps toward the
U.N. and OECD conventions on corruption. However, Wolfensohn’s speech
came to represent a paradigm shift, a turning point after which corruption could
be addressed more easily in diplomatic circles and research. 17
It was the World Bank president himself who initiated the new focus on
corruption, since before that, corruption had been very much a taboo in the
organization. According to Sebastian Mallaby, speaking about corruption was
thought to “violate the Bank’s apolitical charter,” and the Bank would be seen as
interfering with politics if concerns about political fraud and theft were raised. 18
16

17

18

This speech was delivered at the World Bank’s annual meeting in October 1996. See James D.
Wolfensohn, Annual Meetings Address, THE WORLD BANK (Oct 1, 1996), http://go.worldbank
.org/PUC5BB8060.
For a review of the process toward establishing the World Bank sanctions regime and how it has
developed in parallel with other international anticorruption initiatives, see The World Bank Group
Integrity Vice Presidency, Annual Update: Fiscal Year 2014, at 1-4 (2014), available at http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/10/09
/000442464_20141009092921/Rendered/PDF/912470BR0SecM2090Box385330B00OUO090.p
df.
SEBASTIAN MALLABY, THE WORLD’S BANKER: A STORY OF FAILED STATES, FINANCIAL CRISES,
AND THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS 176 (2004).

Winter 2016

531

Chicago Journal of International Law

Despite staff members’ attempts to defend anticorruption as a pro-development
strategy 19—that is, independent from politics regarding the allocation of scarce
resources—the organization still struggles with this concern. While its “apolitical
charter” has not prevented the World Bank from attempting to influence real
politics—on budget priorities, infrastructure, liberalization, health, education, and
so on—the concern seems to have prevented it from efficiently raising issues of
grand-scale “grabbing,” operationalizing the recommendations of the
organization’s many political economy analyses, and placing governance
conditions on its lending.
Several of President Wolfensohn’s reform initiatives seem to have been
started on his (fairly good) instinct, but without sufficient anchoring in the
organization’s bureaucracy of development experts, Mallaby explains. 20 Some
high-level decisions led to hasty solutions in the organization—which might have
been the case with the new fight against corruption. While Wolfensohn’s
commitment to anticorruption led the Bank’s researchers to develop new crosscountry data sources, background information for corruption indices,
procurement systems, and integrity mechanisms more generally, it seems that little
thought was given to how to secure country ownership of this agenda. Instead,
the Bank developed best-practice policy procedures as a menu of options for
governments, and it started to rank countries on how their various governance
institutions performed. Moreover, the Bank resolved to lead by example—there
should not be corruption and fraud among World Bank staff, or in World Bankfinanced operations. 21
Toward this end, the organization’s Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) was
established in 2001. It was supposed to investigate allegations of fraud and
corruption in World Bank-financed projects and present its findings to the already
established Sanctions Committee. 22 Its attention was directed at World Bank staff
19

These attempts include external reports and internal papers on governance and anticorruption, as
well as quite high-level debates on the balance between interfering too much and too little against
corruption. See, for example, the legal note by Anne-Marie Leroy, the World Bank Group’s General
Counsel, who defends the anticorruption agenda and underscores the importance of engaging with
the criminal justice sector, even when , she seems to imply, high-level political figures are implicated
in wrongdoing. Anne-Marie Leroy, Legal Note on Bank Involvement in the Criminal Justice Sector, THE
WORLD BANK (Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAW
JUSTINST/Resources/CriminalJusticeLegalNote.pdf.

20

MALLABY, supra note 18, at 180-83.
The World Bank’s ambition to “lead by example” has been stated in several of its publications,
recently in the. See, for example, The World Bank, 2015 Sustainability Review, at 1 (2015), available at
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/22723/20150sustainability0revi
ew.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
See The World Bank Group Integrity Vice Presidency, supra note 17, at 2; see also Thornburg report,
supra note 5, at 16-19, and The World Bank, Sanctions Board Statute, art. III (2010), available at

21

22
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overseeing development programs, as well as those possibly involved in client
economies. Hence, from the outset, to the extent that the World Bank was
inclined to place sanctions on offenders, it focused on those who violated its own
regulations and procurement guidelines. The sanction process did not relate to the
governments that were expected to control the funds, nor was it anchored in
efforts to strengthen their criminal justice systems. This means that the World
Bank responded to cases of corruption in its projects as issues to be sanctioned
and solved internally, in and by its own systems, rather than as problems to be
addressed in the larger context of corruption in recipient governments.
In order to assess its sanctions system in terms of efficiency, fairness, and
transparency, the World Bank invited a group of experts led by Dick Thornburgh
to make recommendations. 23 The Thornburgh report, as it is known, significantly
influenced the design of the sanctions regime, especially with respect to the
fairness of procedures and the position of the sanctions-determining body vis-àvis investigations. 24 It also helped establish the protection of funds as the main
purpose of the regime.

III. T HE C URRENT S ANCTIONS R EGIME
Following the Thornburgh report and internal reviews, the World Bank
further developed its definitions, strategies, and procedures for imposing
sanctions upon detected offenses. 25 This Section addresses some characteristics
of the resulting regime. Hence, we focus specifically on the role of sanctions in a
development perspective, leaving aside the whole range of other Bank-initiated
anticorruption efforts. In III.A we look closer at the meaning of “offenses” and
“sanctions” in the World Bank’s regime while in III.B we pay particular attention
to the due process mechanisms of the regime.

A. Forms of Offenses and Sanctions
The offenses subject to sanctions by the World Bank sanctions regime
include corrupt practices, fraudulent practices, collusive practices (usually

23

24

25

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/SanctionsBoardStatute_9_15
_2010.pdf.
See Thornburgh Report, supra note 5, at 1. Dick Thornburgh formerly served as U.N. UnderSecretary-General and as U.S. Attorney General.
The implications of the report were confirmed by the World Bank in a review of their integrity
measures. See generally The World Bank Group Integrity Vice Presidency, supra note 17.
Documents presenting details about the current regime and its historical development are available
on the World Bank sanctions website. See LEROY & FARIELLO, supra note 5, at 2-6, 9-11; The World
Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment, supra note 3, at 7-17; The World Bank Group Integrity
Vice Presidency, Annual Update: Fiscal Year 2014, supra note 17, at 1-4, 18-26.
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referring to cartels in markets), coercive practices (involving harm or threats of
harm), and obstructive practices (hindering investigations), as stipulated in the
World Bank Sanctions Procedures of April 15, 2012. 26 The definitions of the
offenses are constant across all World Bank lending and operations. Within the
Bank they are considered as violations/offenses that should be reacted to
regardless of how the acts are legally defined and sanctioned by lending
governments. Individuals or firms that have committed one of the listed offenses
while operating on government contracts financed by the World Bank are
consequently viewed as offenders; in the World Bank terminology often referred
to as respondents.
The sanctions in use are primarily conditional or unconditional temporary
debarment (suppliers are excluded from operating on World Bank-financed
contracts worldwide), “naming and shaming” (those debarred are listed on a
public website), a form of negotiated settlement with the INT, and a letter of
reprimand. 27 The offense most frequently sanctioned is fraudulent practices. This
was the offense in 86 percent of cases of debarment in the period 2007–2013,
according to the Office of Suspension and Debarment. Corruption occurred in
14 percent of cases, and collusion in 9 percent. 28 The different percentages
primarily reflect differences in the ease of investigating cases and do not
necessarily reflect the distribution of ongoing crimes. Compared to detecting
fraud, uncovering corruption and collusion usually requires more difficult and
time-consuming investigations, and therefore the figures on the latter forms of
crime are lower.
In 2010 the impact of sanctions was intensified when the biggest
development banks reached an agreement on cross-debarment, meaning that a
firm or individual found guilty by one of the organizations will almost
automatically be debarred by the others. 29 The agreement includes the African
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank
Group, and the World Bank Group. 30 This means that the “sanction,” typically
26

27
28

29
30

See The World Bank, Sanctions Procedures, § 1.02(a), Annex A (April 15, 2012), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/WBGSanctions_Procedures_
April2012_Final.pdf.
See id. at §§ 9.01, 10.01.
The percentages total more than 100 percent because some cases included several forms of
sanctionable conduct. See The World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment, supra note 3, at
28.
For a review of important World Bank reforms, see LEROY & FARIELLO, supra note 5, at 22-24.
See African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American Development Bank Group, & World Bank
Group, Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions, Preamble (Apr. 9, 2010), available at
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debarment that varies in length from six months to several years, now implies
exclusion from tenders on all contracts financed by any of these banks and,
therefore, exclusion from a large world market. 31

B. Due Process in Sanction Decisions
The sanctions regime implies that the World Bank exercises legal powers
that are normally associated with national sanctioning systems. The Bank itself has
always maintained that the system is fundamentally administrative. 32 However,
looking at the types of violations that are regulated, the far-reaching sanctions and
the relatively independent system for investigating breaches, and considering the
kind of national remedies it effectively replaces, one could ask whether the World
Bank’s sanctioning regime does not also reflect criminal justice mechanisms. 33
In any case, it seems clear the Bank places substantial weight on due process
procedures—intended to ensure fairness, regularity, and transparency—in making
certain decisions about the application of sanctions. The result is a procedure that
in many respects resembles criminal law procedures at the national level. A
separate unit, the INT, is responsible for carrying out investigations and can act
independently in response to complaints of sanctionable practices. 34 These
complaints are typically received from World Bank representatives with oversight

31

32
33

34

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/3601045-1377105390925/
AgreementforMutualEnforcementofDebarmentDecisions(4.9.2010).pdf. The agreement is
confirmed in a World Bank introduction to the sanctions regime from October 2010. See The World
Bank Sanctions Regime: An Overview, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/Overview-SecM2010-0543.pdf.
For information and debate, see Fariello & Daly, supra note 2, at 259-69. See also Stephen S.
Zimmermann and Frank A. Fariello., Jr., Coordinating the Fight against Fraud and Corruption: Agreement
on Cross-Debarment among Multilateral Development Banks, 3 WORLD BANK LEGAL REV 189, 189-204
(Eds Hasanne Cissé, Daniel D. Bradlow and Benedict Kingsbury, 2002).
See LEROY & FARIELLO, supra note 5, at 2; Thornburgh et al., supra note 5, at 14-15.
In fact, The Supreme Court of Norway concluded in a Norwegian foreign bribery case that the
accused company should not be imposed any (additional) corporate criminal sanctions partly
because, inter alia, “the act had resulted in extensive reactions from the World Bank.” Combined
with the likely consequence of further debarment from public procurement markets, the court left
out corporate penalty on the rationale that “viewed collectively [it] might have disproportionate
consequences for the company”—a decision made with 3-2 dissenting votes regarding this
rationale. For details, see HR-2013-1394-A, case no. 2012/2114), Norconsult:
http://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-domstol/-Norges-Hoyesterett/Summary-of-RecentSupreme-Court-Decisions/Summary-of-Supreme-Court-Decisions-2013/. For a discussion on the
concept of a “Criminal justice system,” see Linda Gröning, Towards a Theory of the Criminal Justice
System in, 99 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR KRIMINALVIDENSKAB 27, 27-46 (2012).
See Staff Guide to INT (2007), Washington DC: The World Bank Group. See
Integrity
Vice
Presidency, The World Bank Group, Guide to the Staff Rule 8.01: Investigative Process, at 4 (2011),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/INT_GuideToStaffRule801
_final_REV.pdf.
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responsibility for funded programs, from government representatives, or from
other stakeholders or witnesses. In carrying out these procedures the INT
operates within strict institutional structures designed to ensure due process.
Another unit, the Evaluation Officers, assesses the allegations of offenses (as
defined by the system) and determines whether the evidence presented is
sufficient to warrant moving ahead with a process akin to prosecution, aimed at
sanctioning the alleged conduct. 35
There are surely many good reasons for such a formal system, even besides
ensuring legal certainty for the accused, so commonly associated with due process.
It is, among other things, clear that a wrong decision hurts not only the debarred
party, but also the Bank and its borrowers in the form of reduced competition. At
the same time, the sanctions system is not consistent in upholding these high
standards of due process. Not all cases require equally high due process standards,
and some cases might benefit from a more administrative approach. In many
cases, suppliers are effectively debarred from all World Bank-financed contracts
from the moment investigation begins. 36 In addition, governments around the
world may lose confidence in suppliers under World Bank investigation, and may,
on that basis, choose to debar them from their public procurement tenders.
Moreover, in many cases those suspected can reach a negotiated settlement with
the INT. This arrangement is similar to a formal plea bargain or a conditional
withdrawal of charge. It consists of an agreement that the INT makes with “the
accused,” typically a supplier. Through that agreement, the accused can influence
the charge, the sanction, and what facts of the case to keep confidential, typically
in exchange for the INT’s access to information, implementation of a convincing
compliance system, and monitoring of the supplier’s business activities. Usually,
the offender must prove commitment to the agreement before the INT will
release it from temporary debarment. Like negotiated settlements in criminal law,
this option of reaching an agreement with the INT arguably speeds up case
processing while also incentivizing compliance. 37 As in other contexts, however,
35

The organization of the sanctions regime and the role of the sanctions board are described in
Sanctions Board, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, Law Digest, 17-22 (2011), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOFFEVASUS/Resources/3601037-1342729035803/
SanctionsBoardLawDigest.pdf.

36

This consequence occurs under public procurement debarment rules as well. See, for example, the
point made in Angela B. Styles, et al., How Proposed Debarment Became Equal to Suspension, at 1-3 (Feb.
2, 2015), available at https://www.crowell.com/files/How-Proposed-Debarment-Became-EqualTo-Suspension.pdf.

37

The World Bank has improved its compliance-incentivizing mechanisms by adjusting the length of
debarment in inverse proportion to the debarred actor’s collaboration with investigators and
enforcement of a convincing compliance system. Once an offender is found to have regained its
position as a trustworthy candidate for World Bank–financed operations, it should no longer be
excluded from such opportunities. Hjelmeng and Søreide consider this provision of settlements to
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such arrangements easily compromise principles of predictability, protection from
self-incrimination, and transparency.
If no settlement is reached and the supplier is found guilty by the Evaluation
Officer, the supplier can appeal the decision to a different body, the Sanctions
Board. This unit, consisting of both World Bank staff and external experts,
functions as an appeals court, again in line with due process considerations. 38 The
Sanctions Board applies a low standard of evidence—if the offender “more likely
than not” is guilty, a sanction will be imposed. This implies a weak presumption
of innocence, particularly when compared to national standards of criminal
evidence. In this aspect the regime is comparable to procurement law debarment
regimes operated by state administrations, where it in many cases is a sufficient
basis for rendering a supplier ineligible to participate in a tender that he or she has
the status of suspect in a crime. 39
In the most recent makeover of the sanctions regime, one of the objectives
was to increase the regime’s degree of transparency. 40 At present, all principles,
rules, definitions, and procedures are set forth in the World Bank Sanctions
Procedures, which are publicly available. Sanctions imposed are made public to
some extent. While the debarred suppliers are officially blacklisted, few details
about the negotiated settlements (or “conditional non-debarment”) are made
public. The supplier can negotiate the content of the press release, and the World
Bank may offer confidentiality in exchange for evidence or commitments to a
compliance system. The provisions of these “deals” therefore cannot be assessed
by the general public. 41

38

39

40
41

be an efficient aspect of the Bank’s debarment strategy. Erling Hjelmeng & Tina Søreide, Debarment
in Public Procurement: Rationales and Realization, in INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY IN SUSTAINABLE
PUBLIC CONTRACTS 215–32 (Gabriella M. Racca & Christopher R. Yukins eds., 2014).
The formal rules of the system are proposed through a process coordinated by the Legal Vice
Presidency, which plays a role similar to that of a justice department in a national government
system. The proposals are approved by the Executive Directors of the World Bank. This is a group
of country representatives with oversight responsibility and authority to appoint and remove the
World Bank president; it is the nearest the World Bank gets to a parliament. This is, however, also
the body with power to interpret the IBRD Articles of Agreement (a form of authority usually
vested in a different institution in countries, such as the Higher Court). The day-to-day
implementation of “the law,” and thus the development of practical law enforcement processes, is
managed by the Evaluation Officers. Their daily judgments are influenced by the body of case law
from the Sanctions Board and, to some extent, by relevant cases from courts in member countries.
For a comparison of the World Bank sanctions regime with debarment in the US public
procurement system, see Dubois, supra note 5, at 195.
See LEROY & FARIELLO, supra note 5, at 12.
Despite the confidentiality around settlements, the World Bank operates the regime transparently,
and publishes statistics about the sanctions regime. See The World Bank Office of Suspension and
Debarment, supra note 3, at 23-31.

Winter 2016

537

Chicago Journal of International Law

IV. T HE E FFICIENCY AND E FFECTIVENESS OF THE
S ANCTIONS R EGIME
When it comes to the overall goal of promoting development, the World
Bank has played an indispensable role in putting good governance and
anticorruption on the policy agenda for governments around the world. However,
what this Article addresses is not the World Bank’s convincing role in
anticorruption in general, but rather the sanctions system’s role in relation to the
World Bank overarching aims such as promoting development.
According to the Sanctions Procedures (Article I), the purpose of this regime
is to protect Bank funds and to serve as “a deterrent upon those who might
otherwise engage in the misuse of the proceeds of Bank financing.” 42 The aims of
deterrence and protecting the funds are important in and of themselves.
Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the regime’s role in contributing to the wider
goals and activities of the World Bank, especially its goal of promoting
development. Despite its more specific objectives, the expectation is that the
regime is coherent with and promotes the World Bank’s overall policies. After all,
the regime was set up by the World Bank itself. Therefore, the sanctions regime
should be expected to promote, or at the very least not work against, integrity in
the relevant markets. Second, it should be expected to actively reduce the risk of
corruption. Third, the regime should be expected to secure confidence in World
Bank operations. Finally, it should be expected to encourage and support
enforcement of anticorruption measures, or at least not undermine them,
especially in terms of enforcing domestic law enforcement. This Section addresses
these different expectations—or aims—in terms of their contributions toward the
overall goal of promoting development and their implications for law
enforcement systems in client countries. It is difficult to assess empirically the
extent to which the aims are met in practice, especially since there is not only an
acute lack of data available for such assessment, but also because there are often
a number of initiatives with similar objectives introduced in a given country. The
debate in this article considers only what can be rationally expected. To what
extent can we assume that these aims are met—or at least not undermined?
From this starting point, we will discuss further how the World Bank’s
sanction system relates to the protection of funds in Section IV.A; the promotion
of development is also dependent on the protection of fair markets, as market
fairness affects the prices and quality of products and services available to firms
and citizens in Section IV.B; closely related to the protection of fair market is the
securing of confidence in the World Bank operations addressed in Section IV.D;
lastly, in this Section IV.E we will also discuss the importance of rebuilding
domestic law enforcement.
42

The World Bank, supra note 26, at § 1.01(a).
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A. Sanction Strategies for Protecting the Funds
Development loans are transferred to governments in need of the World
Bank’s monetary services. Governments are expected to spend the funds in
accordance with the agreed-upon development goals and existing integrity
mechanisms. Once funds are transferred, as mentioned, the recipient
government—and not the World Bank—conducts the spending, including
procurement of services from domestic and international suppliers. When
corruption, collusion, or fraud occurs and distorts the intended benefits of World
Bank aid and loans, the wrongdoing often involves government representatives—
sometimes high-ranking civil servants and politicians—in addition to players in
the private sector, both individuals and firms. Whoever is to blame, once the funds
are received, the recipient government is in charge of protecting the funds and
spending and is at least indirectly responsible for any inadequate management and
control of the funds.
Given the World Bank’s position, mandate, history, and collaboration with
governments, the sanctions system primarily targets suppliers on government
contracts. As explained in Section II, the World Bank needs to collaborate closely
with governments to ensure progress of the various development programs it
funds. Those involved in overseeing the programs might be worried that a more
demanding line on corruption would place this collaboration at risk. Such
concerns may explain the current solution, where primarily the firms actively
involved in the specified forms of crime, including when bribes have been
demanded by government officials, are held responsible. The question is not
whether there should be consequences for suppliers involved in corruption, which
is rather undisputed, but rather, if these private actors are the most responsible
offenders, given the World Bank’s explicit allocation of responsibilities for the
management of funds and its own definitions of crime. Are suppliers the ones
who should be the main subjects of investigation and prosecution? Should the
investigation of their offenses be the responsibility of the World Bank? Or could
there be alternative solutions whereby the World Bank investigators function
primarily as advisers to domestic police forces while the recipient government is
under pressure to enforce the law? 43
One argument for targeting primarily private sector suppliers on World Bank
financed contracts could be that if government representatives are involved in a
crime, they will do what they can to prevent an investigation that puts their own
position and properties at risk. But this is not necessarily a problem in all cases
worth investigating and prosecuting; very often the perpetrators are not influential
43

See Frank A. Fariello, Jr. & Giovanni Bo, Development-Oriented Alternatives to Debarment as an
Anticorruption Accountability Tool, 6 WORLD BANK LEGAL REV., 415, 429 (2015).
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enough to stop an investigation. Instead of finding alternative solutions for
circumstances involving highly influential perpetrators, the World Bank has
chosen not to discriminate, and acts in general as if it cannot rely on recipient
governments’ law enforcement systems. 44 Instead, the Bank conducts its own law
enforcement initiatives in all cases of suspected violations in Bank-financed
projects. 45 In light of this strategy, the World Bank will not automatically rely on
any other government’s or court’s judgment of a supplier, and excludes from
procurement only those suppliers that have been found guilty by its own
investigators, through its own sanctions process. 46 This means that a company
found guilty of bribery by a court in South Africa, Sweden, or Chile, for example—
but not by the World Bank sanctions system—can still be found eligible to
participate in tenders for World Bank contracts. This asks if the risk of mistakenly
trusting the judgment of a foreign court is more serious than the risk of allowing
suspected suppliers to participate in tenders. In practice, however, World Bank
investigators are inclined to react to alleged cases of fraud or corruption, and upon
their own assessment of the evidence, they might proceed with a process toward
debarment.
In any case, the organization’s insistence on sanctioning only those found
guilty by its own system can be understood in light of two considerations. First,
the World Bank has country offices in about one hundred countries and closely
follows the performance of state institutions. 47 In a good number of countries, it
cannot rely on the fair judgment of the national criminal justice system, for reasons
that may include low capacity, integrity issues, or politically steered decision
making. 48 If the Bank were to officially trust the courts in certain countries and
not in others, it could easily compromise its own attempts to maintain good
dialogue with governments whose courts were deemed untrustworthy. Second,
44

45
46

47

48

After the Thornburg report’s recommendation, the World Bank operates as if it has the burden of
proof, see The World Bank Group, supra note 6. For a sanction to be imposed, the World Bank
must be able to document the offense. In cases documented by a court or in cases of an alleged
offense, the INT will be inclined to investigate the facts.
See generally The World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment, supra note 3.
See World Bank Sanctions Procedures (as adopted by the World Bank as of January 01, 2011), THE WORLD
BANK (Jan. 2011), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources
/WBGSanctionsProceduresJan2011.pdf;. See also Seiler & Madir, supra note 2, at 13-15, 28-29.
See Public Sector Governance - Governance and Anti-Corruption Diagnostics, THE WORLD BANK (Oct. 4,
2015), available at, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUB
LICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:23410781~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062
~theSitePK:286305,00.html.
Criminal justice systems around the world are subject to severe challenges in terms of insufficient
capacity and various forms of corruption. See generally Richard E. Messick & Sofie A. Schutte,
Corruption Risks in the Criminal Justice Chain and Tools for Assessment, 6 U4 1 (Mar. 2015), available at
http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-risks-in-the-criminal-justice-chain-and-tools-forassessment/. For data on the performance of criminal justice systems and risk of corruption, see
WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT (Oct. 4, 2015), http://worldjusticeproject.org.
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while the World Bank’s “legal powers” in corruption cases are based on nothing
more than the decision not to buy from a certain supplier (just as ordinary people
can bypass a certain shop they do not like), the Bank seems very aware of the
potential consequences of imposing such a sanction on suppliers. On this issue,
however, its signals are somewhat inconsistent, given the mentioned fact that
suppliers are effectively debarred from the moment they are under World Bank
investigation. At the same time, the organization maintains the importance of
playing it safe in terms of protecting its reputation and finds it difficult to sanction
a supplier unless it has used its own institutional judgment and can clearly defend
the process behind the sanction as just and fair.
Nonetheless, given the ultimate goal of protecting development funds, it
appears even more inconsistent to hold suppliers responsible for offenses and not
to focus primarily on the governments that are charged with the responsibility to
manage the funds efficiently. It cannot be claimed that funds are better protected
by holding only suppliers responsible for decisions that are, in fact, controlled by
government representatives.

B. Promoting Fair Markets
The first expectation of the sanctions regime, listed above, is that it
promotes—or at the very least does not work against—the integrity in the relevant
markets. When it comes to promoting development, the protection of fair markets
is essential, as market fairness affects the prices and quality of products and
services available to firms and citizens. Excluding corrupt players is seen as a
strategy to level the playing field for honest, development-promoting competition.
The problem with this solution is that we need to keep suppliers in the market for
the sake of competition. The more suppliers are excluded, the more competition
is distorted and the more market power accrues to the remaining suppliers. At this
point, the price-quality combination easily deteriorates—to the detriment of
development. Temporary debarment of corrupt players is nevertheless justified if
it has longer-term impact on integrity and fairness, with positive indirect
consequences for the market—in this case, the global market for World Bankfinanced contracts.
The World Bank relies on debarment of dishonest suppliers as a strategy
against corruption, apparently without regard to the level of integrity it expects of
the recipient-government agencies involved in procurement. An implicit
assumption behind the debarment logic is that the procurement agency is honest,
but in countries where corruption is known to be a problem, that assumption may
not hold. If a government agency prefers to collaborate with dishonest suppliers,
it is unlikely that top-down enforced debarment of suppliers will have positive
effects in terms of promoting fair markets. Excluding certain firms may even
enable the agency to extract higher bribes from the firms that remain in the market
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if, given weaker competition, there are more profits to share between a corrupt
government agent and the supplier. In the most extreme scenario, a corrupt
procurement agent could demand very high bribes from a firm that stands to gain
from sole source procurement. Moreover, the more suppliers are excluded, the
fewer the number of remaining firms, and the easier it is for them to facilitate
cartel collaboration. 49 This is exactly in the interest of the organized crime that
infiltrates private sector markets, a substantial problem in a number of developing
countries. In either case, the power to control contract allocation as well as the
size of a bribe rests largely with the procurement agent and not so much with the
targeted suppliers. Removing a supplier will not necessarily reduce the
procurement agent’s inclination or opportunity to demand bribes, unless it deters
corruption by raising the risks. 50
Debarment is not even an optimal solution when procurement agencies are
honest—as most are likely to be, even in countries with perceived high levels of
corruption. In terms of its impacts on a given society, the decision to debar entails
a trade-off: one accepts fewer bidders with the likely result of weaker competition
with inferior price-quality combinations in the short run in order to reduce
corruption risks in the long run. Externally imposed (global) debarment of
suppliers, however, does not allow a government to weigh the short-term costs
against the presumed long-term benefits of reduced corruption in their own
markets. Instead, by weakening competition, it imposes a cost on society in terms
of higher prices and lower quality. If corruption is not really a problem because
procurement agencies are honest, suppliers will not be able to bribe agents for
market benefits, and, the costs incurred by weakening competition will not be
compensated by higher levels of integrity (because this level is already high). The
impact of debarment in a society where honest procurement agents control the
allocation of contracts, then, is simply to restrict the market—corruption in
procurement cannot be reduced if it is not a problem in the first place. Dishonest
suppliers should be kept away from tenders, but this is already in the interest of
honest procurement agents, who will not give contracts to suppliers in exchange
for bribes. The undesired market consequences of debarment are especially
pronounced in oligopoly markets with few suppliers, a not uncommon market
situation in developing countries. 51
49

50

51

By intuition, the bidders have more to gain by sharing cartel profits when there are fewer bidders,
and with fewer bidders it is also easier to organize an illegal cartel. For an explanation, see JEANJACQUES LAFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION
536-550 (1993).
See Fariello, Jr. & Bo, supra note 43, at 419-23 (describing similar concerns with the sanctions
regime).
According to Iimi (2011), who studied worldwide infrastructure projects financed by aid or
development loans, the average number of bidders is 5.2 in the water and sewerage sector, 6.2 in
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In sum, it is difficult to see how global debarment of dishonest suppliers will
improve integrity in public procurement markets, whether procurement agents are
honest or dishonest. In order to reduce the risk of unintended market distortions,
governments can introduce measures that promote competition, such as
competition authority controls and an investment-friendly business climate. When
it comes to competition-friendly designs of the sanctions regime specifically, the
option of negotiated settlements might be a good model, since it secures the
intended effects of debarment while returning suppliers more quickly to the
market. 52 However, given the lack of transparency about these settlements, it is
difficult to tell how they work from a development perspective.

C. Reducing the Risk of Corruption
Over the last decade we have witnessed increasing attention to the
consequences of corruption, implementation of international anticorruption
conventions, and a growing availability of information about the integrity
performance of both firms and governments. 53 Firms increasingly are rewarded
by criminal justice systems for their internal compliance programs. In this context,
the World Bank’s sanctions regime has been one of several important forces that
the roads sector, and 4.6 in the electricity sector. In the majority of electricity works and water
auctions only two or three firms were competing for the contracts. Atsushi Iimi, Public Procurement:
Learning from the Experience of Developing Countries, in EMERGING ISSUES IN COMPETITION, COLLUSION,
AND REGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 119, 129-30 (Estache ed., 2011). See also Antonio
Estache & Atsushi Iimi, Quality or Price? Evidence from ODA-Financed Public Procurement, 40 PUB. FIN.
REV. 435 (2012) (these details were first described by Emmanuelle Auriol & Tina Søreide, infra
note 53). The World Bank’s observation of higher risk of collusion when there are few bidders is
described in the Fraud and Corruption Awareness Handbook: A Handbook for Civil Servants Involved in
Public Procurement, THE WORLD BANK 33-36 (2013), available at https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/18153/877290PUB0Frau00Box382147B00PUBLIC0.p
df?sequence=1. For a discussion about the risk of cartelization due to few bidders on World Bank
financed projects, see Curbing Fraud, Corruption, and Collusion in the Roads Sector, THE WORLD BANK
INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY 12-15 (June 2011), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/Roads_Paper_Final.pdf. Hence, debarment applied as an
anticorruption strategy in markets with few suppliers can easily increase the risk of cartel
collaboration between remaining suppliers, and it is not necessarily a welfare-enhancing strategy
even if procurement agents are corrupt. The mechanisms at play are analyzed in Emmanuelle Auriol
& Tina Søreide, An Economic Analysis of Debarment, NHH DEP’T OF BUS. AND MGMT. SCI.
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2015/23 (Sept. 11, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2662374.
52

On this point, the World Bank regime is better designed than many national systems when it comes
to incentivizing compliance. Protection of markets may require placing more emphasis on
debarment of individuals involved in the listed forms of crime, for example, a group of leaders,
rather than sanctioning the entire organization that they represent.

53

See, for example, the emphasis given to anticorruption by the U.N., the OECD, and the G20. Over
the past 15 years, we have witnessed a sharp increase in the amount of various governance and
business indicators, many of them including estimates of corruption.
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have pushed the integrity agenda in the right direction, and whatever inefficiencies
it might have, the powerful signaling effect of this regime cannot be ignored.
Companies operating in the relevant markets are pushed, if not forced, to take
into account the threat of sanctions and consider what this means for their
business operations. Moreover, now that the main development banks operate
with automatic cross-debarment, it is reasonable to expect the regime to have a
certain deterrent and/or norm-developing effect. Most likely, it reduces the
propensity among many suppliers to offer bribes. According to Hugette Labelle,
then-Chair of Transparency International, “the World Bank’s sanction process is
critical to eradicate fraud, corruption and collusion from the projects it
finances.” 54 To what extent is this assumption correct?
The problem with a supplier-focused sanctions regime as a pro-development
anticorruption strategy is similar to the issue discussed above: a more hesitant
attitude toward corruption among suppliers will not necessarily stop government
representatives from demanding bribes. The obtainable profits for those involved
and the bribes for the corrupt decision makers may in fact increase if one or more
suppliers are debarred from a given market. Typically, in a developing country
context or in an emerging market economy, law enforcement institutions are far
from robust, and despite the World Bank’s sanctions regime, the risk of being
caught in corruption is still very low. For this reason, and despite expected
deterrent signaling effects of the sanctions regime, corrupt government officials
may still experience a steady supply of firms willing to take part in a corrupt deal.
Indeed, the role of a supplier involved in corruption is often to allow the
government representatives in charge to use a World Bank-financed contract as a
tool for organizing the transfer of funds from the state and into their personal
bank accounts. The fewer suppliers who are willing to offer such opportunities
for corruption and fraud, for example as the result of a heightened risk of being
caught and sanctioned, the more a (remaining) corrupt supplier can demand in
contract negotiations and, eventually, the more profitable the deal. 55 Therefore, a
deterrent effect on suppliers coming from the World Bank sanctions system could
reduce the number of corrupt transactions, while leaving the total amount of bribe
benefits and the most serious cases unaffected. A decline in the number of firms
54

55

Press release - Corrected: World Bank Debarments and Suspensions Play Important Role in Fighting Corruption,
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (June 26, 2014), https://www.transparency.org/news/press
release/world_bank_debarments_and_suspensions_play_important_role_in_fighting_corru.
For explanation of how the size of bribes depends on shifts in the supply and demand functions,
see generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978).
The argument follows from the analysis of bribes as a price that clears the market between those
involved in corruption. For an explanation, see Tina Søreide & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption in
State Administration, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL
MISDEALING, 6-7 (Jennifer H. Arlen ed. (forthcoming 2016)).
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willing to offer bribes may simply imply huge benefits for those firms that are still
involved in such crime. For these reasons, the problem cannot be solved by
holding only the bribe-paying side responsible. 56 If the government
representatives cannot be reached, the system can hardly be seen as an efficient
means of reducing corruption in government-controlled spending. To some
extent, therefore, it seems that the World Bank sanctions regime in many cases
targets the wrong offenders, or at least does not target all the offenders.

D. Securing Confidence in World Bank Operations
A development bank cannot function according to its stated purpose unless
it enjoys a level of trust. 57 It needs trust from its donors, who support the bank’s
operations in the belief that funds will not disappear into the pockets of the wrong
people along the way. Well-confirmed risks of fraud and corruption in borrowing
countries effectively set limits on a development bank’s trustworthiness.
Taxpayers in donor countries are increasingly aware of such risks. They are also
concerned about how donor funding may fuel corruption, and possibly have a
deleterious, if counterintuitive, effect on development. 58 For the World Bank, it is
therefore essential to show that such risks are small if it handles the transfer of
funds. In an era when donor countries have expressed significant concerns about
the transfer of funds through the Bank, the sanctions regime helps restore
credibility to World Bank operations.
The problem with this strategy is that it is not the World Bank’s own
activities that jeopardize the institution’s trustworthiness. Rather, it is the actions
of recipient governments and third-party contractors operating domestically. Any
measure intended to enhance donor trust in the Bank necessarily involves and
affects these third parties. At the same time, it is only by means of its own actions
56

An analysis of the market consequences of competition between firms with different risk of facing
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Søreide, Corruption and Competition for Natural Resources, 21 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 997, 999-1001
(2014).
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and controls that the Bank can influence donors’ perceptions of its
trustworthiness. Through its sanctions regime, the World Bank tries to convince
donors that it controls a risk that in fact is not under its control. 59 By constructing
a comprehensive regime instead of using a simple administrative public
procurement debarment list, the Bank underscores the seriousness of its
commitment to anticorruption. 60 Nevertheless, since the main control over state
revenues and contract allocations rests with state administrations, a sanctions
regime targeted only at fraudulent suppliers cannot, in itself, secure donor
confidence in the World Bank’s operations.
Instead of thinking critically about the strategy underlying its sanctions
regime, the World Bank seems stuck on the idea that the regime will fulfill
expectations if its internal organization and procedures are sufficiently well
designed. Over the past decade, the Bank has made continuous efforts to
strengthen the design of the system, soliciting reviews and making
improvements; 61 the assumption seems to be that pro-development consequences
will follow automatically if only the procedures are good enough. 62 There have
been no attempts in this period, however, to empirically explore the consequences
of sanctions or to assess systemically what happens in markets where suppliers
have been debarred. 63 As far as we are aware, there has not been a single study
seeking to determine whether sanctions are associated with greater integrity,
fairness, and competition in markets or with a noticeable reduction in corruption
and fraud. Those overseeing the regime have been preoccupied with developing
proper standards and procedures. It is possible that the organization is now
preparing to undertake such impact evaluations (although this is not mentioned
in the information brief on the review process). At present, however, it appears
that the World Bank is more concerned with improving donor confidence by
demonstrating an ability to impose sanctions than with verifying that the sanctions
actually reduce corruption and fraud.
Given the objectives of the sanctions regime and the importance of securing
confidence in World Bank operations, there is a need to think differently about
the system’s motivations and purpose. First, it is motivated by the corruption and
59
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fraud taking place in World Bank-financed programs and operations. Second, it
has evolved as a solution to ensure donor trust in the Bank’s ability to manage
funds responsibly. But, third, the system is motivated also by the incapacity of
domestic criminal justice systems to tackle the problem. These motivations have
led the World Bank to try to deal with corruption and fraud through its own
sanctions regime—as if the problem could be detached from the domestic
government system in recipient countries. Notwithstanding recently increased
collaboration with domestic authorities, the sanctions regime continues to process
and sanction cases independently from domestic law enforcement agencies. In the
long run, this strategy sustains the distrust in domestic law enforcement.

E. Reinforcing Domestic Law Enforcement
The sanctions strategy is expected to promote law enforcement. However,
this strategy may not only fail to reinforce the enforcement aimed at fraud and
corruption, as discussed. Considered separately from other law enforcement
initiatives, it may also fail to contribute to stronger domestic criminal justice
institutions. This is a critical concern, since these institutions are better placed than
the World Bank to deal with domestic fraud and corruption. By signaling that
domestic criminal justice institutions cannot be relied on, the World Bank
contributes to any domestic reputation that they are untrustworthy. Despite the
de facto weaknesses of these institutions, it is essential for them to earn trust in
their respective societies in order to start functioning efficiently. When law
enforcement institutions are not trusted, members of the public find different,
usually more informal ways to solve their disputes and complaints. In some cases,
they make use of corruption or extortion to “solve” their problems. 64 The
difficulty for governments that are trying to strengthen their criminal justice
systems is that they need to convince citizens to start using and trusting public law
enforcement institutions at a time when these are still weak, albeit progressing.
The World Bank cannot trust organizations that are not reliable. At the same
time, by refusing to trust any domestic courts the Bank’s sanctions regime upholds
a public belief that domestic institutions lack the capacity to enforce the laws of
their countries. Such perceptions effectively push both private parties and public
officials toward alternative and informal strategies to solve their issues, often
through bribery or corruption. This undermines development and is precisely
what the sanctions regime is supposed to work against. In order to align the
protection of funds with its overall development goals, the Bank must realize that
it depends on domestic law enforcement institutions.
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V. T OWARD M ORE E FFICIENT S OLUTIO NS
The World Bank will have to start expecting borrower governments to
secure an independent and legally accountable judiciary, protect the borrowed
funds, and enforce their anticorruption regulations. What steps have been taken
and can be taken to progress in this direction? First, instead of concentrating so
much on improving the internal procedures of its own sanctions system, the
organization should seek to identify and strengthen its various channels for
demanding workable integrity systems in the countries where it finances
development programs. 65 INT already collaborates with law enforcement
institutions at the national level when an offense has been committed. It
encourages these institutions to investigate and prosecute actors involved in the
offense who are outside the reach of the World Bank investigation, including
government representatives. This collaboration could be extended—for example,
INT representatives could serve as advisers to the prosecution and remain in the
country as the case moves through the domestic criminal justice system. 66
Second, the World Bank will have to envisage alternative scenarios for how
fraud and corruption can be sanctioned. Instead of focusing so closely on
suppliers, the Bank could also sanction governments for failing to investigate and
prosecute guilty government representatives and suppliers. If this is difficult due
to the weaknesses of law enforcement institutions and public finance management
systems, why not demand collaboration for the strengthening of such institutions
as a precondition for lending? And if that too is difficult, the Bank could dust off
Paul Collier’s suggestion and introduce what he calls “ex post conditionality” on
governance, which means rewarding strong performance with more financial
support or more flexibility in spending. 67 When it comes to checks and balances,
it could make sense, as a second-best solution, to let an external third party control
the government’s management of funds. Such services are offered by lawyers,
accountants, or investigators who are independent from both the World Bank and
the government in question. 68
65
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A certain independence from the World Bank task managers who oversee the spending is clearly
needed, according to the basic principle of checks and balances, since task managers are mandated
to complete projects and may find dealing with corruption an obstacle to their aims. Many of them
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Regarding a more constructive use of financial power for pro-development
purposes, the main development banks could collaborate in order to shut down
borrower governments’ current option to “find another development bank” when
one bank makes annoying demands for integrity. The development banks already
collaborate on cross-debarment, so why not collaborate on conditions for lending
as well? If they can cooperate on cross-debarment, they could collaborate on
“cross-referrals”—meaning, for example, that loans will not be offered unless a
given case is brought through the domestic criminal justice system. 69 If it becomes
too difficult to hold back financial support, given urgent development needs, the
financial institutions could place restrictions on the government’s flexibility and
control over spending—the less reliable the government, the more external
control placed on each dollar spent. The funds could be kept under the control of
the government’s more reliable institutions or transferred to more reliable city
governments instead of leaving control with the central (monopoly) level. 70 Of
course, there can be a big leap from ideas about options to practical solutions.
One case in which difficulties surfaced was the building of the Chad-Cameroon
pipeline, which was completed in 2003 with multilateral and bilateral credit
financing, including $100 million from the World Bank. In this case the World
Bank insisted that the revenues from the pipeline be kept out of the Chadian
president’s control, except for spending on stipulated development needs. 71
Although in this case the strategy failed in the end, the World Bank should not
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give up on such efforts. Strategies to keep funds away from corrupt dictators are
necessary to support the populations that are victimized and paralyzed by an
autocratic regime. Despite the many difficulties, it should be possible for the Bank
to let confirmed corruption risks have implications for lending, and to be stricter
in its demands for integrity mechanisms and law enforcement institutions.
When it comes to the sanctions system, the World Bank may well continue
to exclude suppliers not found trustworthy. Ideally, the governments should bear
the main responsibility for excluding unreliable suppliers from their public
procurement markets. In case they do not, the World Bank should maintain a list
of firms not found eligible for contracts, although the mentioned tradeoffs
associated with global and local debarment in short and long-term development
perspectives need to be understood and taken into account. Besides, while it is
important that the sanctions regime continue to ensure better due process
standards, it is equally important that the World Bank and the sanctions regime
encourage due process in domestic law enforcement institutions.
The World Bank could continue to reach its own judgment in each case by
assessing the allegations or suspicions, entering into dialogue with public
investigators, reviewing available evidence, and finally deciding whether to list a
supplier as eligible or not eligible, based on specified criteria and an assessment of
the market consequences. Combined with more transparent settlement
procedures and efficient compliance control enforced in collaboration with
national third-party players, it could be possible to bring debarred suppliers
quickly back to their markets, thus protecting competition. It is difficult to predict
how various World Bank stakeholders would respond to a simpler administrative
solution with more attention to domestic law enforcement when cases arise, but
a change in this direction seems necessary for the system to have a real impact on
the ground that furthers the Bank’s main objectives. When it comes to
collaboration with the other development banks, it is far more important to agree
on how to efficiently demand integrity mechanisms on the government side than
to cross-debar suppliers.
The World Bank is already considering alternative designs for its sanctions
system and anticorruption strategy. However, for the Bank to alter its sanctions
system and modify its strategies vis-à-vis governments, it needs the support of its
board members, who represent governments. In particular, more efficient
solutions will require the support of the most influential governments (or group
of governments). Internationally, we have seen significant progress in
governments’ willingness to sign and implement new anticorruption laws, and the
World Bank has played a central role in promoting such developments.
Nonetheless, the organization’s own suggestions on how to strengthen the
international anticorruption agenda have sometimes met resistance when
presented to the Bank’s own board. Government representatives, including those
from countries scoring high on the Human Development Index, are sometimes
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hesitant to support more efficient anticorruption initiatives. 72 Some of these
countries also fail to enforce their foreign bribery laws and thus do not meet their
own obligations when it comes to controlling corruption in developing countries.
For the World Bank to be able to work more efficiently on anticorruption,
however, it needs the full support of governments.

VI. C ONCLUS ION
The World Bank has a challenging mandate: the institution must offer
financial support to developing country governments, including those with high
corruption risks, while also trying to secure efficient use of the funds after they
have been transferred and are no longer under the control of the World Bank.
The sanctions regime must be understood in light of the organization’s need to
secure the confidence of donor governments while offering financial support to
countries where a high risk of fraud and corruption exists. One of its main
strategies has been to develop an internal mechanism of law enforcement that
targets fraud and corruption only on the part of suppliers to government contracts
while respecting principles of due process.
Nonetheless, there are reasons to be concerned about the sanctions regime’s
efficiency in contributing to the World Bank’s overall development goals.
Considering not just the internal efficiency and transparency of the process but
also the larger role and impact of the sanctions regime, it appears that the regime
runs a high risk of not protecting funds; that it does not promote fair markets, but
quite possibly promotes unfair markets; that it does not reduce the overall level of
corruption; and, finally, that rather than rebuild and reform domestic law
enforcement, it serves to undermine these institutions, which should be the
primary venue for addressing fraud and corruption in client countries. The World
Bank Legal Vice Presidency, which oversees the sanctions system, has shown
interest in understanding the root causes of corruption in order to better assess
the Bank’s anticorruption initiatives. 73 A thorough exploration is likely to reveal
that the present design of the sanctions regime is not based upon an understanding
of root causes of corruption nor the domestic market consequences of sanctions,
and that the calls for debates about the regime’s functionality are warranted.
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In order to show strong accountability to donor governments and appear to
be acting forcefully against corruption, the organization tries to solve the
corruption problems in developing countries at the central headquarters level of
the Bank itself—which means not solving them at all. In bypassing domestic law
enforcement in client countries, the sanctions strategy declares the Bank’s low
confidence in criminal justice institutions at the national level. This is a problem
for developing country governments, which need law enforcement institutions
that are trusted by the public in those countries to serve their intended law
enforcement and conflict resolution functions. The World Bank should realize
that it depends on these institutions in order to solve problems of corruption and
fraud, in line with its development agenda.
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